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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This appeal involves an ERISA plan's subrogation 
rights, specifically whether a plan must contribute to the legal 
expenses of a plan participant's recovery against a third party. 
 We addressed this issue in Ryan by Capria-Ryan v. Fed. Express 
Corp., 78 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 1996), decided after the district 
court here rendered judgment.  In this appeal we are asked to 
distinguish Ryan or in the alternative to reconsider our holding 
in Ryan. 
I. 
 Bollman Hat Company sponsors a self-insured, ERISA-
regulated employee benefit plan.  After a Bollman employee, Kevin 
Root, was injured in a motorcycle accident, the Plan paid him 





third party responsible for his personal injuries and obtained a 
 $215,000.00 settlement.   
 Bollman sought full reimbursement from Root in 
accordance with § 10.8 of the Plan, which provides:   
In the event of any payment under the Plan to any covered person, 
the Plan shall, to the extent of such payment, be 
subrogated, unless otherwise prohibited by law, to all 
the rights of recovery of the covered person arising 
out of any claim or cause of action which may accrue 
because of alleged negligent conduct of a third party. 
 Any such covered person hereby agrees to reimburse the 
Plan for any payments so made hereunder out of any 
monies recovered from such third party as the result of 
judgment, settlement, or otherwise . . . . 
 
(emphasis added).  Root complied with Bollman's request for 
reimbursement in part, but withheld $30,507.13 to pay a portion 
of the attorney's fees and costs incurred in obtaining the third 
party settlement. 
 Bollman contends the terms of the Plan require full 
reimbursement and do not allow Root to withhold money for 
attorney's fees.  Bollman also maintains Root expressly agreed to 
full reimbursement when he signed a Reimbursement Agreement 
before receiving the $100,197.92 from the Plan.  The 
Reimbursement Agreement provides: 
I, Kevin T. Root, understand and acknowledge that my medical plan 
has a reimbursement provision which provides that 
medical benefits paid under the plan are to be 
reimbursed up to the amount of such benefits paid from 
any payments, awards or settlements which may be paid 







 As sponsor of the Plan, Bollman brought suit against 
Root in district court for $30,507.13.
1
 
  Following stipulations of fact and cross-motions for summary 
judgment, the district court granted summary judgment to Root.  
Finding Root's personal injury litigation substantially benefited 
Bollman, the district court held Bollman would be unjustly 
enriched if Root bore the full burden of litigation costs.  
Bollman appeals, citing our intervening decision in Ryan by 
Capria-Ryan v. Fed. Express Corp., 78 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 1996). 
II. 
 Bollman states in its complaint that jurisdiction 
arises under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461.  A case may arise under ERISA 
where the suit is filed by a plan sponsor who is also a 
fiduciary.  See Northeast Dep't ILGWU Health and Welfare Fund v. 
Teamsters Local Union No. 229 Welfare Fund, 764 F.2d 147, 153 (3d 
Cir. 1985) (we must "narrowly and literally" interpret ERISA's 
civil enforcement provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1132, which allows only 
a participant, a beneficiary, or a fiduciary to sue).  A plan 
sponsor is a fiduciary only "to the extent" it acts in a 
fiduciary capacity.  29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (definition of 
"fiduciary").  See also Malia v. General Elec. Co., 23 F.2d 828, 
833 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 377 (1994).   
                     
1.    The parties stipulated that $30,507.13 is the amount due if 
defendants prevail.  Bollman named as a defendant Dale Anstine, 
P.C., who holds the disputed $30,507.13 in an escrow account 





 Bollman has limited the "extent" to which it is a 
fiduciary by delegating some of its fiduciary duties.  At least 
one circuit has held a suit brought by a plan sponsor as a 
fiduciary does not arise under ERISA unless the action is related 
to the fiduciary duties retained by the plan sponsor.  See Coyne 
& Delany Co. v. Selman, 98 F.3d 1457, 1465 (4th Cir. 1996).  Cf. 
Northeast Dep't, 764 F.2d at 154 ("[O]ne's status as fiduciary 
under ERISA is dependant upon one's relationship to a particular 
plan.")  It is unclear whether Bollman retained fiduciary duties 
which are in any way relevant to this lawsuit.  But we do not 
need to resolve this issue here.  Even if our jurisdiction does 
not arise under the statute itself, we nonetheless have 
jurisdiction arising under the federal common law developed 
pursuant to ERISA.  See Airco Indus. Gases, Inc. Div. of the BOC 
Group, Inc. v. Teamsters Health and Welfare Pension Fund of 
Philadelphia and Vicinity, 850 F.2d 1028, 1033-34 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(ERISA case may arise under federal common law where it does not 
arise directly under the statute).   
 Federal question jurisdiction will support claims 
arising under federal common law as well as those of a statutory 
origin.  See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, Wis., 406 U.S. 91, 
100 (1972).  A case arises under federal common law if the issue 
presented is one "of central concern" to ERISA.  Airco, 850 F.2d 
at 1033 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of the State of Cal. v. 
Constructions Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 
26-27 (1983)).  This is such a case.  See, e.g., Provident Life & 





(holding the issue of "whether federal courts should impart 
unjust enrichment principles into the gaps left by ERISA" is one 
of central concern to the statute), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 982 
(1990); Northeast Dep't, 764 F.2d 147 (we have federal question 
jurisdiction to determine a question that implicates ERISA).   
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our 
review of the district court's grant of summary judgment is 
plenary.  See Ryan by Capria-Ryan v. Fed. Express Corp., 78 F.3d 
123, 125 (3d Cir. 1996).  
III. 
 
 Shortly after the district court granted Root summary 
judgment, we held in Ryan by Capria-Ryan v. Fed. Express Corp., 
78 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 1996), that an ERISA plan participant whose 
third party recovery is subrogated to the plan may not withhold 
attorney's fees where the plan unambiguously requires full 
reimbursement.  See id. at 127.  Bollman contends this case is 
indistinguishable from Ryan. 
 A. 
 The Ryans were employees of Federal Express and 
participants in its ERISA plan.  After Mrs. Ryan gave birth to a 
daughter with cerebral palsy and severe brain damage, the Federal 
Express plan paid medical expenses.  Meanwhile, the Ryans brought 
suit for medical malpractice.  After the suit was settled, the 
Federal Express plan demanded full reimbursement.  The Ryans 
refused, insisting on withholding a portion of counsel fees 





 The Federal Express plan's subrogation provision 
provided, "[I]f benefits are paid on account of an illness 
resulting from the intentional actions or from the negligence of 
a third party, the Plan shall have the right to recover, against 
any source which makes payments or to be reimbursed by the 
Covered Participant who receives such benefits, 100% of the 
amount of covered benefits paid."  Ryan, 78 F.3d at 124.   
 The Ryans sued Federal Express.  The district court 
granted the Ryans summary judgment based on the common law 
doctrine of unjust enrichment.  On appeal, we reviewed the reach 
of federal courts to apply common law doctrines in ERISA actions 
and reversed, holding that common law may not "override a 
subrogation provision in an ERISA-regulated plan on the ground 
that the plan would be unjustly enriched if it were to be 
enforced as written."  Id.  We stated: 
The language of the subrogation provision at issue here 
unambiguously requires the Ryans to pay back all the 
money they received from the Plan.  Since the Ryans 
have failed to establish that the Plan `conflict[s] 
with the statutory policies of ERISA' and have 
similarly failed to show that the common law right at 
issue `is necessary to . . . effectuate a statutory 
policy,' we must reject the Ryans' attempt to establish 
the common law right they would have us recognize. 
 
Id. at 127 (citations omitted).  We also held that "[e]nrichment 
is not `unjust' where it is allowed by the express terms of the . 
. . plan."  Id. (quoting Cummings by Techmeier v. Briggs & 
Stratton Retirement Plan, 797 F.2d 383, 390 (7th Cir.), cert. 






 Root argues Ryan is distinguishable because the 
subrogation provision in the Bollman plan is ambiguous and does 
not require full reimbursement.  Whether an ERISA plan is 
ambiguous is a question of law.  See In re Unisys Corp. Long-Term 
Disability Plan ERISA Litig., 97 F.3d 710, 715 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 We will look to the words of the Plan to make this 
determination.  See id. ("[T]he parties remain bound by the 
appropriate objective definition of the words they use to express 
their intent.") (quoting Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Business 
Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001, 1013 (3d Cir. 1980)); Ryan, 78 F.3d 
at 126.  The Bollman plan requires reimbursement of "any 
payments" made by the Plan to a participant, and provides for 
subrogation to "all [of Root's] rights of recovery."  As used in 
the plan, the words "any" and "all" both mean "the whole of" or 
"every."  Black's Law Dictionary 74, 94 (6th ed. 1990).  
Notwithstanding the universal scope of "any" and "all," Root 
attempts to distinguish the Bollman plan, which called for "100%" 
reimbursement.  We see no distinction.  On this point, we find 
the Ryan plan and the Bollman plan to be materially identical and 
the Bollman plan to be unambiguous. 
 Root also contends the Plan is ambiguous on Bollman's 
duty to pay Root's attorney's fees because it provides, "The 
Company shall pay fees and costs associated with the enforcement 
of the Plan rights."  But the application of this provision is 
expressly limited to "enforcement of the Plan rights," i.e. 





require the Plan to fund actions to enforce the independent 
rights of a plan beneficiary against a third party. 
 C. 
 Root maintains the Reimbursement Agreement he signed is 
ambiguous because it does not specifically address attorney's 
fees.  But the Reimbursement Agreement requires reimbursement "up 
to the amount of such benefits paid."  A plan or agreement need 
not specifically address attorney's fees in order to 




 The major thrust of Root's argument is that Ryan was 
incorrectly decided and should be overruled.  Amicus, the 
Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association, also urges us to 
reconsider our holding in Ryan.  Of course, a panel of our court 
cannot overrule a prior published decision.
3
  Only the court en 
banc may do this.  See Third Circuit I.O.P. 9.1. 
                     
2.    Root also argues the Reimbursement Agreement is an 
unconscionable adhesion contract.  But the parties' stipulations 
of fact, which were the sole factual basis for the district 
court's decision on summary judgment, do not contain facts 
necessary to support this argument.  Generally we do not consider 
facts raised for the first time on appeal.  See Harris v. City of 
Philadelphia, 35 F.3d 840, 845 (3d Cir. 1994). 
3.    We note the holding in Ryan has support in the case law.  
See Cutting v. Jerome Foods, Inc., 993 F.2d 1293, 1298-99 (7th 
Cir.) (declining to adopt federal common law rule preventing full 
reimbursement where the clear language of an ERISA plan requires 
full reimbursement), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 916 (1993); Blackburn 
v. Becker, 933 F. Supp. 724, 729 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (employee may 
not withhold attorney's fees because "there is no reason to 
fiddle with an unambiguous plan provision which the parties 
freely entered into."); Trident Reg'l Health Sys. v. Polin, 948 
F. Supp. 509, 514 (D.S.C. 1996) ("[F]ederal courts do not rewrite 
the unambiguous terms of an ERISA plan . . . ."); Provident Life 
& Accident Ins. Co. v. Williams, 858 F. Supp. 907, 912 (W.D. Ark. 





 Nonetheless, amicus contends Ryan will lead to 
inequitable results where a plan participant's third party 
recovery is less than the plan's subrogation claim plus 
attorney's fees.  But Root's third party settlement fully 
financed his attorney's fees and the subrogation claim.  We will 
not address hypothetical scenarios. 
 Amicus also contends Ryan may hinder settlement of 
claims by plan participants against third parties.  This prospect 
is troublesome.  But Ryan holds only that we must uphold 
unambiguous plan terms that do not conflict with ERISA's 
statutory policies.  Depending on the circumstances, parties to a 
subrogation agreement may still be able to negotiate compromises 
on attorneys' fees. 
 V. 
 Finally, Root raises an issue apparently not raised in 
Ryan.  Citing the common law on subrogation, Root maintains that 
a subrogee may not recover more than the subrogor.  Although his 
argument is not explicit, it appears Root advocates a pro rata 
(..continued) 
recognizing that "if the right to reimbursement were 
contractually defined, the parties could expressly agree that 
reimbursement would be the first money out of the settlement 
monies with no deduction for attorneys fees and costs."); 
Thompson v. Fed. Express Corp., 809 F. Supp. 950, 958 (M.D. Ga. 
1992) (holding plan participant may not withhold portion of 
attorney's fees where plan required full reimbursement).  But see 
Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Waller, 906 F.2d 985, 993 
(4th Cir.) (requiring reimbursement under theory of unjust 
enrichment because ERISA indicates Congress's desire to ensure 
that plans are administered equitably and "that no one party, not 
even plan beneficiaries, should unjustly profit."), cert. denied, 
498 U.S. 982 (1990); Dugan v. Nickla, 763 F. Supp. 981, 984-85 
(N.D. Ill. 1991) (reducing reimbursement to reflect payment of 






reduction of the Plan's subrogation lien, i.e. the Plan's 
recovery should be limited, as Root's recovery was limited, by a 
pro rata portion of the attorney's fees.  See, e.g., Simmons v. 
Cohen, 551 A.2d 1124, 1127 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (holding that, 
where welfare recipients sued to recover SSI awards which were 
subrogated to the state department of public welfare, the state 
department subrogee had common law duty to contribute to their 
legal expenses).  
 ERISA is silent on the issue of subrogation.  Ryan, 78 
F.3d at 127.  We may adopt a common law principle only if 
"necessary to fill in interstitially or otherwise effectuate the 
statutory pattern enacted in the large by Congress."  Plucinski 
v. I.A.M. Nat'l Pension Fund, 875 F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(quoting Van Orman v. American Ins. Co., 680 F.2d 301, 312 (3d 
Cir. 1982)).  Otherwise, we may not create substantive ERISA 
rights.  See Hamilton v. Air Jamaica, Ltd., 945 F.2d 74, 78 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (Courts have "no authority to draft the substantive 
content in [ERISA] plans.") (quoting Blau v. Del Monte Corp., 748 
F.2d 1348, 1353 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 
(1985)), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 938 (1992); Van Orman v. American 
Ins. Co., 680 F.2d 301, 312 (3d Cir. 1982).   
 Root has not established that full reimbursement of 
subrogation claims conflicts with ERISA's policies or that 
adoption of a pro rata reduction is necessary to effectuate these 
policies.  In fact, the policies underlying ERISA generally 
counsel reliance on unambiguous plan language.  Van Orman, 680 





plan provisions . . . .").  Although circumstances may arise 
necessitating a pro rata reduction in reimbursement, we find 
Root's argument in this case unconvincing. 
 VI.  Conclusion 
 For the reasons stated, we will reverse the grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Root and remand to the district 
court to enter judgment in favor of Bollman.  See Ryan by Capria-
Ryan v. Fed. Express Corp., 78 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
                         
 
